Immanuel Kant (3)

Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason

In the second of the two Books of "The Transcendental Dialectic", Kant undertakes to demonstrate the contradictory nature of unbounded reason. He does this by developing contradictions in each of the three metaphysical disciplines that he contends are in fact pseudosciences. This section of the Critique is long and Kant's arguments are extremely detailed. In this context, it not possible to do much more than enumerate the topics of discussion. The first chapter addresses what Kant terms the paralogismsi.e., false inferencesthat pure reason makes in the metaphysical discipline of rational psychology.

He argues that one cannot take the mere thought of "I" in the proposition "I think" as the proper cognition of "I" as an object. In this way, he claims to debunk various metaphysical theses about the substantiality, unity, and self-identity of the soul. The second chapter, which is the longest, takes up the topic Kant calls the antinomies of pure reasonthat is, the contradictions of reason with itselfin the metaphysical discipline of rational cosmology. Originally, Kant had thought that all transcendental illusion could be analyzed in antinomic terms. He presents four cases in which he claims reason is able to prove opposing theses with equal plausibility:

- That "reason seems to be able to prove that the universe is both finite and infinite in space and time";

- that "reason seems to be able to prove that matter both is and is not infinitely divisible into ever smaller parts";

- that "reason seems to be able to prove that free will cannot be a causally efficacious part of the world (because all of nature is deterministic) and yet that it must be such a cause"; and,

- that "reason seems to be able to prove that there is and there is not a necessary being (which some would identify with God)".

Kant further argues in each case that his doctrine of transcendental idealism is able to resolve the antinomy. The third chapter examines fallacious arguments about God in rational theology under the heading of the "Ideal of Pure Reason". (Whereas an idea is a pure concept generated by reason, an ideal is the concept of an idea as an individual thing.) Here Kant addresses and claims to refute three traditional arguments for the existence of God: the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, and the physio-theological argument (i.e., the argument from design).

The results of the transcendental dialectic so far appear to be entirely negative. In an Appendix to this section, Kant rejects such a conclusion. The ideas of pure reason, he argues, have an important regulatory function in directing and organizing our theoretical and practical inquiry. Kant's later works elaborate upon this function at length and in detail.

Moral Thought

See main article: Kantian ethics. Kant developed his ethics, or moral philosophy, in three works: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and Metaphysics of Morals (1797).With regard to morality, Kant argued that the source of the good lies not in anything outside the human subject, either in nature or given by God, but rather is only the good will itself. A good will is one that acts from duty in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself.

This law obliges one to treat humanityunderstood as rational agency, and represented through oneself as well as othersas an end in itself rather than (merely) as means to other ends the individual might hold. Kant is known for his theory that all moral obligation is grounded in what he calls the "categorical imperative", which is derived from the concept of duty. He argues that the moral law is a principle of reason itself, not based on contingent facts about the world, such as what would make us happy; to act on the moral law has no other motive than "worthiness to be happy".

Idea of Freedom

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes between the transcendental idea of freedom, which as a psychological concept is "mainly empirical" and refers to "whether a faculty of beginning a series of successive things or states from itself is to be assumed", and the practical concept of freedom as the independence of our will from the "coercion" or "necessitation through sensuous impulses".

Kant finds it a source of difficulty that the practical idea of freedom is founded on the transcendental idea of freedom, but for the sake of practical interests uses the practical meaning, taking "no account of ...its transcendental meaning", which he feels was properly "disposed of" in the Third Antinomy, and as an element in the question of the freedom of the will is for philosophy "a real stumbling block" that has embarrassed speculative reason.

Kant calls practical "everything that is possible through freedom"; he calls the pure practical laws that are never given through sensuous conditions, but are held analogously with the universal law of causality, moral laws. Reason can give us only the "pragmatic laws of free action through the senses", but pure practical laws given by reason a priori dictate "what is to be done".

Kant's categories of freedom function primarily as conditions for the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be understood as free, and (iii) to be morally evaluated. For Kant, although actions as theoretical objects are constituted by means of the theoretical categories, actions as practical objects (objects of practical use of reason, and which can be good or bad) are constituted by means of the categories of freedom. Only in this way can actions, as phenomena, be a consequence of freedom, and be understood and evaluated as such.

Categorical Imperative

Kant makes a distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is one that we must obey to satisfy contingent desires. A categorical imperative binds us regardless of our desires: for example, everyone has a duty to respect others as individual ends in themselves, regardless of circumstances, even though it is sometimes in our narrowly selfish interest to not do so. These imperatives are morally binding because of the categorical form of their maxims, rather than contingent facts about an agent.

Unlike hypothetical imperatives, which bind us insofar as we are part of a group or society which we owe duties to, we cannot opt out of the categorical imperative, because we cannot opt out of being rational agents. We owe a duty to rationality by virtue of being rational agents; therefore, rational moral principles apply to all rational agents at all times. Stated in other terms, with all forms of instrumental rationality excluded from morality, "the moral law itself, Kant holds, can only be the form of lawfulness itself, because nothing else is left once all content has been rejected".

Kant provides three formulations for the categorical imperative. He claims that these are necessarily equivalent, as all being expressions of the pure universality of the moral law as such; many scholars are not convinced. The formulas are as follows:

- Formula of Universal Law: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you at the same time can will that it become a universal law"; alternatively,

- Formula of the Law of Nature: "So act, as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."

- Formula of Humanity as End in Itself: "So act that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means".

- Formula of Autonomy: "the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law", or "Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law"; alternatively,

- Formula of the Realm of Ends: "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends."]

Kant defines maxim as a "subjective principle of volition", which is distinguished from an "objective principle or 'practical law. While "the latter is valid for every rational being and is a 'principle according to which they ought to act[,]' a maxim 'contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often their ignorance or inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act.

Maxims fail to qualify as practical laws if they produce a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will when universalized. A contradiction in conception happens when, if a maxim were to be universalized, it ceases to make sense, because the "maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law". For example, if the maxim 'It is permissible to break promises' was universalized, no one would trust any promises made, so the idea of a promise would become meaningless; the maxim would be self-contradictory because, when it is universalized, promises cease to be meaningful.

The maxim is not moral because it is logically impossible to universalizethat is, we could not conceive of a world where this maxim was universalized. A maxim can also be immoral if it creates a contradiction in the will when universalized. This does not mean a logical contradiction, but that universalizing the maxim leads to a state of affairs that no rational being would desire.

"The Doctrine of Virtue"

As Kant explains in the 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and as its title directly indicates, that text is "nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality". His promised Metaphysics of Morals was much delayed and did not appear until its two parts, "The Doctrine of Right" and "The Doctrine of Virtue", were published separately in 1797 and 1798.

The first deals with political philosophy, the second with ethics. "The Doctrine of Virtue" provides "a very different account of ordinary moral reasoning" than the one suggested by the Groundwork. It is concerned with duties of virtue or "ends that are at the same time duties". It is here, in the domain of ethics, that the greatest innovation by The Metaphysics of Morals is to be found. According to Kant's account, "ordinary moral reasoning is fundamentally teleologicalit is reasoning about what ends we are constrained by morality to pursue, and the priorities among these ends we are required to observe".

There are two sorts of ends that it is our duty to have: our own perfection and the happiness of others (MS 6:385). "Perfection" includes both our natural perfection (the development of our talents, skills, and capacities of understanding) and moral perfection (our virtuous disposition) (MS 6:387). A person's "happiness" is the greatest rational whole of the ends the person set for the sake of her own satisfaction (MS 6:387-388).

Kant's elaboration of this teleological doctrine offers up a moral theory very different from the one typically attributed to him on the basis of his foundational works alone.

Political Philosophy

See main article: Political philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project, Kant listed several conditions that he thought necessary for ending wars and creating a lasting peace. They included a world of constitutional republics. His classical republican theory was extended in the Doctrine of Right, the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals (1797). Kant believed that universal history leads to the ultimate world of republican states at peace, but his theory was not pragmatic. The process was described in Perpetual Peace as natural rather than rational:

Kant's political thought can be summarized as republican government and international organization: "In more characteristically Kantian terms, it is doctrine of the state based upon the law (Rechtsstaat) and of eternal peace. Indeed, in each of these formulations, both terms express the same idea: that of legal constitution or of 'peace through law.

"Kant's political philosophy, being essentially a legal doctrine, rejects by definition the opposition between moral education and the play of passions as alternate foundations for social life. The state is defined as the union of men under law. The state rightly so called is constituted by laws which are necessary a priori because they flow from the very concept of law. A regime can be judged by no other criteria nor be assigned any other functions, than those proper to the lawful order as such."

Kant opposed "democracy", which at his time meant direct democracy, believing that majority rule posed a threat to individual liberty. He stated that "democracy in the strict sense of the word is necessarily a despotism because it establishes an executive power in which all decide for and, if need be, against one (who thus does not agree), so that all, who are nevertheless not all, decide; and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom."

As with most writers at the time, Kant distinguished three forms of governmentnamely, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchywith mixed government as the most ideal form of it. He believed in republican ideals and forms of governance, and rule of law brought on by them. Although Kant published this as a "popular piece", Mary J. Gregor points out that two years later, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims to demonstrate systematically that "establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a part of the doctrine of right, but rather the entire final end of the doctrine of right within the limits of mere reason".

The Doctrine of Right, published in 1797, contains Kant's most mature and systematic contribution to political philosophy. It addresses duties according to law, which are "concerned only with protecting the external freedom of individuals" and indifferent to incentives. Although there is a moral duty "to limit ourselves to actions that are right, that duty is not part of [right] itself". Its basic political idea is that "each person's entitlement to be his or her own master is only consistent with the entitlements of others if public legal institutions are in place". He formulates the universal principle of right as:

Religious Writings

See main article: Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Starting in the 20th century, commentators tended to see Kant as having a strained relationship with religion, although in the nineteenth century this had not been the prevalent view. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, whose letters helped make Kant famous, wrote: "I believe that I may infer without reservation that the interest of religion, and of Christianity in particular, accords completely with the result of the Critique of Reason". According to Johann Schultz, who wrote one of the first commentaries on Kant: "And does not this system itself cohere most splendidly with the Christian religion? Do not the divinity and beneficence of the latter become all the more evident?"

The reason for these views was Kant's moral theology and the widespread belief that his philosophy was the great antithesis to Spinozism, which was widely seen as a form of sophisticated pantheism or even atheism. As Kant's philosophy disregarded the possibility of arguing for God through pure reason alone, for the same reasons it also disregarded the possibility of arguing against God through pure reason alone.

Kant directs his strongest criticisms of the organization and practices of religious organizations at those that encourage what he sees as a religion of counterfeit service to God. Among the major targets of his criticism are external ritual, superstition, and a hierarchical church order. He sees these as efforts to make oneself pleasing to God in ways other than conscientious adherence to the principle of moral rightness in choosing and acting upon one's maxims.

Kant's criticisms on these matters, along with his rejection of certain theoretical proofs for the existence of God that were grounded in pure reason (particularly the ontological argument) and his philosophical commentary on some Christian doctrines, have resulted in interpretations that see Kant as hostile to religion in general and to Christianity in particular. Other interpreters, nevertheless, consider that Kant was trying to mark off defensible from indefensible Christian belief.

Regarding Kant's conception of religion, some critics have argued that he was sympathetic to deism. Other critics have argued that Kant's moral conception moves from deism to theism (as moral theism), for example Allen W. Wood, as well as Merold Westphal. As for Kant's book Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, it was emphasized that Kant reduced religiosity to rationality, religion to morality, and Christianity to ethics; however, many interpreters, including Wood, alongside Lawrence Pasternack, now agree with Stephen Palmquist's claim that a better way of reading Kant's Religion is to see him as raising morality to the status of religion.

Aesthetics

Kant discusses the subjective nature of aesthetic qualities and experiences in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764). Kant's contribution to aesthetic theory is developed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), where he investigates the possibility and logical status of "judgments of taste". In the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment", the first major division of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant used the term "aesthetic" in a manner that resembles its modern sense. In the Critique of Pure Reason, to note essential differences between judgments of taste, moral judgments, and scientific judgments, Kant abandoned the term "aesthetic" as "designating the critique of taste", noting that judgments of taste could never be "directed" by "laws a priori".

After A. G. Baumgarten, who wrote Aesthetica (1750-58), Kant was one of the first philosophers to develop and integrate aesthetic theory into a unified and comprehensive philosophical system, utilizing ideas that played an integral role throughout his philosophy. In the chapter "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant states that beauty is not a property of an artwork or natural phenomenon, but is instead consciousness of the pleasure that attends the 'free play' of the imagination and the understanding. Even though it appears that we are using reason to decide what is beautiful, the judgment is not a cognitive judgment, "and is consequently not logical, but aesthetical".

A pure judgement of taste is subjective since it refers to the emotional response of the subject and is based upon nothing but esteem for an object itself: it is a disinterested pleasure, and we feel that pure judgements of taste (i.e., judgements of beauty), lay claim to universal validity. This universal validity is not derived from a determinate concept of beauty but from common sense. Kant also believed that a judgment of taste shares characteristics with a moral judgment: both are disinterested, and we hold them to be universal. In the chapter "Analytic of the Sublime," Kant identifies the sublime as an aesthetic quality that, like beauty, is subjective, but unlike beauty, it refers to an indeterminate relationship between the faculties of the imagination and reason.

It also shares the character of moral judgments in its engagement with reason. The feeling of the sublime, divided into two distinct modes (the mathematical and the dynamical sublime), describes two subjective moments that concern the relationship of the faculty of the imagination to reason. Some commentators argue that Kant's critical philosophy contains a third kind of the sublime, the moral sublime, which is the aesthetic response to the moral law or a representation, and a development of the "noble" sublime in Kant's theory of 1764.

The mathematical sublime results from the failure of the imagination to comprehend natural objects that appear boundless and formless, or appear "absolutely great". This imaginative failure is then recuperated through the pleasure taken in reason's assertion of the concept of infinity. In this move the faculty of reason proves itself superior to our fallible sensible self. In the dynamical sublime, there is the sense of annihilation of the sensible self as the imagination tries to comprehend a vast might.

This power of nature threatens us but through the resistance of reason to such sensible annihilation, the subject feels a pleasure and a sense of the human moral vocation. This appreciation of moral feeling through exposure to the sublime helps to develop moral character. Kant developed a theory of humor, which has been interpreted as an "incongruity" theory. He illustrated his theory of humor by telling three narrative jokes in the Critique of Judgment. He thought that the physiological impact of humor is akin to that of music.

Kant developed a distinction between an object of art as a material value subject to the conventions of society and the transcendental condition of the judgment of taste as a "refined" value in his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784). In the Fourth and Fifth Theses of that work he identified all art as the "fruits of unsociableness" due to men's "antagonism in society" and, in the Seventh Thesis, asserted that while such material property is indicative of a civilized state, only the ideal of morality and the universalization of refined value through the improvement of the mind "belongs to culture".